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PRETRIAL DISCLOSURE OF FEDERAL
GRAND JURY TESTIMONYt
William J. Knudsen, Jr.*
The grand jury, an institution of ancient common law origin,' has
been criticized during the 19th and 20th centuries. 2 In fact, it was
abolished in Great Britain, the country of its birth, in 1933.3 The ar-
guments most often made against the grand jury are that the jury is a
needless expense; that it may be slow to act in areas where it meets
infrequently; and that it seldom provides protection against unjust
prosecution, since the prosecutor generally has great influence with
the jury and may simply use the jury to insulate himself from responsi-
bility. Proponents of the grand jury argue that it retains the power to
serve as a check on capricious accusation, especially when dealing
with political, racial or religious minorities; 4 that the indicting proc-
t This article was originally written as a report to the Committee on Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference by William J. Knudsen,
Jr., Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis and Clark College, and law
students R. Ray Heysell, David N. Lackey, Allen L. Reel and Muriel T. Sparkman. The
authors wish to acknowledge the cooperation and assistance in this project of Lloyd F.
Dunn, Esq., William G. Simon, Esq., Dean C. Smith, Esq. and The Honorable A. J.
Zirpoli, all members of the Committee.
-Regarding the present status of the Report, the Conference has tabled it until next
year. See note 141, infra.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis and Clark College; B.S., St.
John's University, 1943; J.D., Columbia, 1948.
1. Kaufman, Tize Grand Jury-Its Role and Its Powers, 17 F.R.D. 331 (1955).
2. Younger, The Grand Jury Under Attack, 46J. CRIM. L. 26, 214 (1955).
3. English opponents of the grand jury system were successful in securing its demise
on the grounds that the system was very expensive, that service on it was a burden on the
citizenry, and that it no longer served any useful function since it had little to do except
ratify committals for trial by examining justices. Younger, supra note 2, at 215-17,
Lieck, Abolition of the Grand Jury in England, 25 J. CRIM. L. 623 (1935).
4. The rationale in support of grand juries is stated succinctly as follows: "Histori-
cally, this body has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of
standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual, mi-
nority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or was
dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will." Wood v. Georgia,
370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). But see Antell, The Modern Grand Jury" Benighted Super-
government, 51 A.B.AJ. 153 (1965), which states the counter argument: "It simply'is
not true that the grand jury system protects the individual from oppression; indeed, it
has a far greater potential as an instrument of oppression.... Realistically, the most
demanding task faced by a conscientious prosecutor is that of making a defendant's
rights understood to a grand jury bent on indicting without sufficient evidence but on
greatprovocation." Id.at 154-55. This condemnation ofgrandjuries is echoed byFriedman:
The most serious criticism of grand juries in recent months has been directed at
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esses allow the prosecution to subpoena witnesses and get their testi-
mony on record; and that the grand jury can express the judgment of
the community in certain cases of political importance. 5
Although the grand jury system has been severely denounced, it
remains firmly a part of the United States federal judicial system be-
cause of its embodiment in the fifth amendment of the Constitution,
which provides in part:6 "No person shall be held to answer for a cap-
ital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
ment of a grand jury ... ." Thus, one must consider the pragmatic
question of whether the federal grand jury system furthers the fair
administration of criminal justice.
The scope of this study is limited to what is probably the most criti-
cized aspect of the traditional grand jury system, the restrictions on
disclosure of grand jury proceedings, especially the criminal defend-
ant's lack of access to a transcript of the testimony given before the
grand jury which indicted him. 7 Examining the history of the grand
jury as it relates to the tradition of secrecy, this study discusses the
philosophies underlying the practice and analyzes the impact of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, federal statutes, and certain
Supreme Court decisions on this tradition. This study concludes that
there is no basis in fact for most of the reasons traditionally given for
grand jury secrecy, and that accordingly every criminal defendant
should be presumed to have the right to discover before trial all grand
jury testimony which the prosecution plans to use against him. How-
the use being made of them by the J ustice Department. I n addition to the Pentagon
Papers case, 10 separate grand juries have been conducting investigations into ac-
tivities of militant antiwar groups throughout the country. Grand juries in Seattle
and Detroit were investigating the bombing of the United States capitol. A Harris-
burg, Pa., grand jury continued to question witnesses about the antidraft activities
of the Berrigan brothers. A Los Angeles grand jury was looking into draft coun-
selling by local priests. And in New York, a Brooklyn grand jury called nuns to
testify about the theft of F.B.I. documents from its Media, Pa., office. While no one
doubts that the Federal Government has the right to conduct such grand jury crime
investigations, many of the witnesses called have charged that the questions asked
have been based on illegal wiretapping or that the Government is forcing them to
incriminate themselves or their friends with only a limited immunity.
Friedman, Grand Juries: Strange Doings by the "Honest Countrymen," N.Y. Times.
Nov. 7, 1971, § 4, at 8, col. I.
5. S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1049 (2d ed. 1969).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455 (1964); Sherry, Grand Jury
Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REV. 668 (1962); Comment.
Federal Grand Jury Secrecy, 5 GONZAGA L. REV. 255 (1970).
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ever, the courts should retain the power to refuse discovery if the pros.
ecution shows a compelling reason to maintain secrecy at that time. In
order to prevent prosecutors from circumventing the defendant's right,
this study recommends that all grand jury testimony be recorded and
that Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be amended
to compel recording and allow pretrial discovery.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Since the courts have relied upon the historic policy of grand jury
secrecy to justify continued prohibition of discovery, stating that this
policy "must not be broken except where there is a compelling necess-
ity,"'8 it is important to examine briefly the history of the grand jury,
particularly its secrecy aspect, in an attempt to separate myth from
reality. In England, the earliest recorded juries were employed to dis-
cover and present facts in answer to inquiries addressed to them by
the King. The jury of "presentment," later the grand jury, was a lineal
descendant of these bodies, and by the time of the Assize of Clarendon
in 1166, it was being used regularly to discover and present to the
King's officials persons suspected of serious crimes. While it was not
the function of the grand jury to determine guilt, the grand jurors did
form part of all of the petit juries at this time, and thus the two bodies
were not entirely separate. By the middle of the 14th century, how-
ever, it was recognized that grand and petit juries had distinctive func-
tions, and the connection between them was completely severed. The
task of the grand jury was merely to determine whether, from the ev-
idence given by the prosecution, there was probable ground for suspi-
cion.9
During the three centuries that followed, the grand jury developed
from a mere instrument of the Crown used to ferret out criminals to a
shield for the protection of the subject against arbitrary accusations by
the government. 10 The full development of the secrecy privilege was a
vital factor in allowing the grand jury to become an effective weapon
for the protection of personal rights, although from early times it had
8. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
9. W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 321-22 (7th ed. 1956).
10. G. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 27 (1906); McClintock, Indictment by a Grand
Jury, 26 MINN. L. REV. 153, 156 (1941).
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been the practice for the grand jury to hear testimony and to deliberate
in private,"' as evidenced by the traditional form of oath administered
to grand jurors:' 2
[Y] ou... shall diligently enquire, and true presentment make of
all such matters and things as shall be given you in charge; the king's
counsel, your fellows, and your own, you shall keep secret; You shall
present no one for envy, hatred or malice; ... but you shall present all
things truly as they come to your knowledge according to the best of
your understanding; So help you God.
Although there is disagreement as to the original reasons for grand
jury proceedings being held in secret, the most likely reason was to
prevent offenders from learning of the proceedings and attempting to
escape prosecution.1 3 It has also been suggested that the principle of
secrecy was developed to protect the King's counsel and permit the
prosecutors to have undisturbed influence over the jury. 14 In any
event, while secrecy of proceedings was customary, it did not become
a right of the grand jurors themselves until a comparatively late
period.15
This right springs from the 17th century when, during the reign of
the Stuarts, the Crown was attempting to control grand juries by the
device of requiring publicity of their proceedings. These attempts were
finally defeated in the Earl of Shaftesbury Trial in 1681.16 The Crown
wished to hold open court examination of the witnesses as to certain
treasonous charges brought against the Earl, but the jurors, relying on
their oaths and the "ancient custom of the kingdom," demanded the
right to examine witnesses in private.' 7 The jurors won their right to
privacy of investigation, and grand jury proceedings were thereafter
invariably held in secrecy,' 8 free from the possibility of coercion by the
state or any other party. Thus, the secrecy privilege also served the
purpose of protecting the grand jurors and witnesses from coercion by
the state.
11. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2360 at 728 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
12. Earl of Shaftesbury's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 759, 772 (1681).
13. G. EDWARDS, supra note 10, at 116.
14. United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 289 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
15. J. WIGMORE. supra note 11.
16. Earl of Shaftesbury's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 759, 772 (1681).
17. Id. at 771-74.
18. J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, at 729.
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The tradition of the grand jury as a bulwark against oppression by
the state was brought to America by the English colonists. Mr. Justice
Field in his famous Charge to a Grand Jury, while sitting as a circuit
judge, stated:1 9
[The grand jury] was at the time of the settlement of this country,
an informing and accusing tribunal only, without whose previous ac-
tion, no person charged with a felony could, except in certain cases, be
put upon his trial. And in the struggles which at times arose in Eng-
land between the powers of the king and the rights of the subject, it
often stood as a barrier against persecution in his name; until at length
it came to be regarded as an institution by which the subject was ren-
dered secure against oppression from unfounded prosecutions of the
Crown.
[T]he institution was adopted in this country, and is continued
from considerations similar to those which give it its chief value in
England, and is designed as a means, not only of bringing to trial per-
sons accused of public offenses upon just grounds, but also as a means
of protecting the citizen against unfounded accusation, whether it
come from government or be prompted by partisan passion or private
enmity.
When the federal government was established, the right to grand
jury indictment was secured to the people in the Bill of Rights in "the
fifth of those articles of amendment.., which were manifestly in-
tended mainly for the security of personal rights. ''2 0 Recognition that
the ultimate function of the secrecy privilege was for the protection of
the rights of the accused was made by Mr. Justice Harlan in his vig-
orous dissent in Hurtado v. California:21
In the secrecy of the investigations by grand juries, the weak and
helpless-proscribed, perhaps, because of their race, or pursued by an
unreasoning public clamor-have found, and will continue to find,
security against official oppression, the cruelty of mobs, the machina-
tions of falsehood, and the malevolence of private persons who would
use the machinery of the law to bring ruin upon their personal ene-
mies.
19. 30 F. Cas. 992-93 (No. 18,255) (C.C.D. Cal. 1872).
20. Exparte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 6(1887).
21. 110 U.S. 516, 554 (1884).
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Thus the grand jury developed in England and entered the stream
of American tradition as a protection for the personal rights of the
people. Grand jurors won the right to hold their proceedings in secret
in order to perform their function of protecting these rights against
both official and private coercion. In one period of the development
of the grand jury in England, the grand jurors conducted the examina-
tion of witnesses themselves and did not permit the prosecutor to enter
the jury room. 22 However, as fear of governmental coercion gradually
subsided, a prosecutor for the Crown or state was permitted to be pre-
sent during the taking of testimony. In 1794, in the indictment of
Hardy and others for treason, a solicitor for the Crown was allowed in
the jury room to help manage the evidence,23 and prosecutors grad-
ually reentered the jury room. By the late 19th and early 20th centu-
ries, there evolved greater latitude in the use of grand jury proceedings
by the state, and today it is a commonly accepted right of the prosecu-
tion to direct the grand jury's investigation. 24 The pendulum has now
swung so far that grand juries have been called the "prosecutor's alter
ego," 25 and prosecuting attorneys vigorously uphold grand jury se-
crecy as a means of protecting their cases from discovery by the de-
fendant.
II. SECRECY AND DISCOVERY
The phrase "traditional grand jury secrecy" has been used to de-
scribe two different issues: secrecy of grand jury proceedings while
they are in progress, and nondisclosure of the transcript or minutes
after the proceedings have terminated. The disclosure of the grand
jury proceedings while in progress and the grand jurors' deliberations
and votes are not in issue, as it is generally accepted that these must
be kept absolutely secret.26 As to the second issue, the subject of this
study, the Supreme Court has recognized that "after the grand jury's
functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of jus-
tice require it.'2 7
22. G. EDWARDS, supra note 10, at 127.
23. Id.
24. Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, I JOHN MARSHALLJ. PRAC. &
PRoc. 18, 19 (1967).
25. Antell, supra note 4, at 156.
26. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 7, at 257.
27. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940).
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The amount of discovery to be permitted in a criminal proceeding
is, of course, a matter of philosophical value judgment-one perhaps
complicated by the privilege against self-incrimination which the de-
fendant enjoys. The proponents of liberal discovery point to the Eng-
lish preliminary hearing-deposition procedure as the quintessence of
discovery.2 8 In the country which created and subsequently abolished
the grand jury, a defendant prosecuted on indictment is now generally
entitled by statute to a preliminary hearing at which he can be pres-
ent, be represented by counsel and be allowed to cross-examine each
prosecution witness. The substance of each witness' testimony is re-
corded in narrative form and signed by him, thus becoming a deposi-
tion. The defendant can then secure copies of these depositions.2 9 This
preliminary hearing becomes a very effective discovery device for the
defense because the prosecution must offer at the hearing all the evi-
dence which it then intends to introduce at the trial. If the prosecution
later discovers additional evidence which it intends to offer it must so
inform the defense. Critics have pointed out that this system is not a
panacea for all the defendant's legitimate discovery needs, since the
prosecution need not produce evidence it does not intend to offer at
trial, even though that evidence might be helpful to the defendant in
preparing his case.30 However, it is a much more liberal procedure
than that followed in most American jurisdictions, including those
applying the federal standards.
Although philosophies in the United States have been changing,
and the trend is toward a liberalization of discovery for the defendant
in criminal litigation,31 the disparity between the very liberal dis-
covery procedures permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
28. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV.
56, 64 (1961).
29. Id. at 65.
30. Id. at 66.
31. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(3) (1970); Dennis v. United
States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966). See note 49 infra for the text of § 3500(e)(3), and see notes
68-71 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of Dennis.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 provides as follows:
DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION
(i) Defendant's Statements; Reports of Examinations and Tests; Defendant's
Grand Jury Testimony. Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the at-
torney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photo-
graph any relevant (1) written or recorded statements or confessions made by the
defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the gov-
ernment, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may
become known, to the attorney for the government, (2) results or reports of phys-
429
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dure and the much more restricted discovery permitted under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure32 illustrates the continuing re-
sistance to pretrial discovery for the criminal defendant. Prior to 1946
when the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted, federal
courts closely guarded the privacy of grand jury proceedings from the
eye of the defendant, mindful of the traditional common law view that
grand jury proceedings were to be kept secret.33
Judges who had been schooled in the established practice of secrecy
were unresponsive to defense attorneys' pleas for disclosure, 34 re-
ical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments made in connec-
tion with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or
control of the government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of
due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the government, and (3) rec-
orded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury.
(b) Other Books, Papers, Documents, Tangible Objects or Places. Upon motion
of a defendant the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the
defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, tangible
objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the pos-
session, custody or control of the government, upon a showing of materiality to the
preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. Except as provided in
subdivision (a) (2), this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of re-
ports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by government
agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or of state-
ments made by government witnesses or prospective government witnesses (other
than the defendant) to agents of the government except as provided in 18 U.S.C. §
3500.
(e) Protective Orders. Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order
that the discovery or inspection be denied, restricted or deferred, or make such
other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by the government the court may
permit the government to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a
written statement to be inspected by the court in camera. If the court enters an
order granting relief following a showing in camera, the entire text of the govern-
ment's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be
made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal by the defendant.
32. See Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
228 (1964).
33. The following statement epitomizes the pre-1946 approval of secrecy in grand
jury proceedings:
We agree with the authorities generally that the granting of such request [per-
mission to inspect the minutes and records of grand jury] would dangerously
impair our system of grand jury procedure. It would open the way for an ex-
ploratory expedition for the purpose of obtaining the government's evidence, and
pave the way for numerous dilatory tactics.
United States v. Molasky, 118 F.2d 128, 132 (7th Cir. 1941).
34. Evidence of judges' loyalty to the tradition of secrecy is abundant; "Even if
there were no precedent, I am in full accord with the policy which denies such permis-
sion [to inspect grand jury minutes]." United States v. Herzig, 26 F.2d 487, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1928). "[The court] will not disregard the time honored precedent in this
court not to grant inspection of the minutes." United States v. Foster, 80 F. Supp. 479.
483 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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jecting all efforts to liberalize federal policy on the premise that such
changes would afford the accused an undeserved and disproportionate
advantage over the prosecution in the preparation of criminal cases.3 5
Nevertheless, on occasion the traditional policy was suspended in cer-
tain limited instances when it was felt that the screen of secrecy stood
in the way of justice.36
III. FEDERAL PRACTICE SINCE 1946
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
1946, specifically Rule 6(e),37 federal courts were provided with a
uniform though inadequate guideline for handling matters concerning
grand jury secrecy. This rule merely served to codify the existing case
law on the subject, limiting disclosure to instances where the de-
fendant was able to show the court grounds for dismissal of the indict-
35. The following statement by Learned Hand typifies judicial resistance to giving
the defendant such an advantage over the prosecution by lenient pretrial grand jury dis-
covery rules:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecu-
tion is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his de-
fense. He is immune from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be con-
victed when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve. Why
in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against him to pick over
at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to see.
United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940).
"After an indictment has been found and the accused has been apprehended, the veil of
secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings may safely be lifted where justice so re-
quires." United States v. Alper, 156 F.2d 222, 226 (2d Cir. 1946). See also Metzler v.
United States, 64 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1933), and United States v. Perlman, 247 F. 158,
161 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), where the court stated:
The right to inspect the grand jury minutes has been accorded to defendants where
sufficient reason appears therefor .... This right, however, should be sjaringly
exercised, unless a strong case is made out requiring examination of the minutes in
furtherance ofjustice, or for the protection of individual rights.
37. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) reads as follows:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations
and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use
in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenog-
rapher, operator of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes recorded testi-
mony may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed
by the court preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when
permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing that grounds
may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring be-
fore the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any person
except in accordance with this rule. The court may direct that an indictment shall
be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has given bail, and in that event
the clerk shall seal the indictment except when necessary for the issuance and exe-
cution of a warrant or summons.
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ment "because of matters occurring before the grand jury"38 or "when
so directed by the court preliminary to and in connection with a judi-
cial proceeding." 39
Although Rule 6(e) seemed to permit the trial court a wide latitude
of discretion, unfortunately no criteria for disclosure of the testimony
of witnesses were included in the rule. Perhaps this was due to the
inability of the draftsmen to improve on the Supreme Court's own
vague standard of "where the ends of justice require it"40 enunciated
some six years previously. At any rate, the courts initially took a con-
servative course, limiting the exercise of judicial discretion under Rule
6(e) to situations where prejudicial irregularity on the part of the
grand jury existed,4' or where perjury of the defendant before the
grand jury was the issue at trial.42
In 1957, however, the Supreme Court in Jencks v. United States43
shook judicial policy toward discovery, adopting a radically new
approach in federal criminal cases. Seeking to impeach certain prose-
cution witnesses, defense counsel in Jencks moved for the production
and examination of pretrial reports given to the F.B.I. by those wit-
nesses concerning subjects about which they testified at trial. The trial
court denied production, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding
"that the petitioner is entitled to inspect the reports to decide whether
to use them in his defense," 44 that no preliminary foundation of incon-
sistency between the witnesses' reports to the F.B.I. and their testi-
38. Id. Rule 6(e) expressly provides that at the request of the defendant the court
may permit disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury upon a showing that
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of such occurrences.
However, this provision has been of minimal importance. There is a presumption that
grand jury proceedings have been conducted with regularity. See, e.g., United States v.
Weber. 197 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1952). Objections based on competency or sufficiency of
the evidence before the grand jury. or upon illegally obtained evidence are likely to
meet with little success. Costello v. United States. 250 U.S. 359 (1956) (indictment
based on hearsay evidence may stand); United States v. Blue. 384 U.S. 251 (1966) (in-
dictment based on illegally obtained evidence may stand). Likewise the courts are reluc-
tant to overturn an indictment on the basis of an assertion that it was the product of per-
jured testimony. The reason generally given is that perjury may be more appropriately
detected at trial. Coppedge v. United States. 311 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1962). cert. de-
nied, 373 U.S. 946 (1963).
39. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
40. Socony-VacumItn, 310 U.S. at 234.
41. United States v. Sugarman, 139 F. Supp. 878. 881 (D.R.I. 1956) (dictum).
42. United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617. 628 (3rd Cir. 1954): United States v.
Remington, 191 F.2d 246. 250 (2d Cir. 1951).
43. 353 U.S. 657(1957).
44. Id. at 668.
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mony at trial need be shown, 45 and that the only prerequisite to pro-
duction of the witnesses' statements was that the events and activities
testifed to by the witnesses at the trial be related to those in the state-
ments. 46
Following Jencks, there was some speculation that the Court's deci-
sion also applied to testimony of grand jury witnesses and thus diluted
the traditional secrecy requirements surrounding grand jury proceed-
ings.47 While Jencks was not specifically concerned with the produc-
tion of grand jury minutes, its rationale subsequently was applied to
permit disclosure of such minutes even before trial.48 In 1958, how-
ever, Congress enacted the Jencks Act,49 which definitively limited the
45. Id. at 666.
46. Id.
47. Sherry, supra note 7, at 671; Comment. The Impact of Jencks v. United States
and Subsequent Legislation on the Secrecy of Grand Jury Minutes, 27 FORDHAM L.
REV. 244 (1958).
48. United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v.
Rosenberg, 245 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1957). See Note, The Aftermath of the Jencks Case,
11 STAN. L. REV. 297, 320 (1959).
49. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970), provides as follows:
Demands for production of statements and reports of witnesses.
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or
report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government
witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the
subject of subpena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct
examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examina-
tion, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce
any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United
States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the
entire contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony
of the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for
his examination.
(c) If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced under
this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of the testi-
mony of the witness, the court shall order the United States to deliver such state-
ment for the inspection of the court in camera. Upon such delivery the court shall
excise the portions of such statement which do not relate to the subject matter of the
testimony of the witness. With such material excised, the court shall then direct de-
livery of such statement to the defendant for his use. If, pursuant to such procedure,
any portion of such statement is withheld from the defendant and the defendant
objects to such withholding, and the trial is continued to an adjudication of the guilt
of the defendant, the entire text of such statement shall be preserved by the United
States and, in the event the defendant appeals, shall be made available to the appel-
late court for the purpose of determining the correctness of the ruling of the trial
judge. Whenever any statement is delivered to a defendant pursuant to this section,
the court in its discretion, upon application of said defendant, may recess proceed-
ings in the trial for such time as it may determine to be reasonably required for the




Jencks decision by (1) only allowing discovery of pretrial statements
and reports made by testifying witnesses to government agents and (2)
omitting any reference to grand jury proceedings.50
In the same year that Congress passed the Jencks Act, the Supreme
Court availed itself again of the opportunity to consider the secrecy of
grand jury testimony. In United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,51 the
government, preparing for trial in a civil proceeding, used the minutes
of a grand jury investigation of antitrust law violations. When the de-
fendants sought to do likewise by moving for production of the grand
jury transcript under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the trial court granted the motion. 52 The government, however, re-
fused to obey the order, forcing the court to dismiss the action. 53 On
appeal, with Mr. Justice Douglas writing for the majority, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, stating, "we start with a long-
(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court under
subsection (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the defendant any such statement, or such
portion thereof as the court may direct, the court shall strike from the record the
testimony of the witness, and the trial shall proceed unless the court in its discretion
shall determine that the interests ofjustice require that a mistrial be declared.
(e) The term "statement," as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section in
relation to any witness called by the United States, means--
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted
or approved by him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcrip-
tion thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made
by said witness and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral
statement; or
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any,
made by said witness to a grand jury.
Prior to 1970, there was no subsection (e) (3), and consequently no reference to the
grand jury. See note 73 and accompanying text infra.
50. From its legislative history, it is clear Congress intended to exclude grand jury
proceedings from the operation of the statute. 1957 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1861,
1862.
51. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
52. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 19 F.R.D. 122 (D.NJ. 1956).
53. 356 U.S. at 679-80:
The District Court entered orders directing the Government to produce the
transcript in 30 days and to permit appellees to inspect and copy it. The Govern-
ment, adamant in its refusal to obey, filed a motion in the District Court re-
questing that those orders be amended to provide that, if production were not
made, the court would dismiss the complaint. Alternatively, the Government
moved the District Court to stay the order pending the filing of an appeal and
an application for extraordinary writ. Appellees did not oppose the motion; and
the District Court entered an amended order providing that, unless the Govern-
ment released the transcript by August 24, 1956, "the Court will enter an order
dismissing the complaint." As the Government persisted in its refusal, the
District Court entered judgment of dismissal.
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established policy that maintains the secrecy of grand jury proceedings
in the federal courts. '5 4 From there it was but a short step to Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas' statement that "this 'indispensable secrecy of grand jury
proceedings'. . . must not be broken except when there is a compelling
necessity. There are instances when that need will outweigh the coun-
tervailing policy. But they must be shown with particularity." 55 The
Court, referring in a footnote to both Socony-Vacuum and Jencks,56
made it clear that it was not dealing with the narrower question of
using a grand jury transcript at the trial stage to impeach a witness: 57
Those are cases of particularized need where the secrecy of the pro-
ceedings is lifted discretely and limitedly. We only hold that no com-
pelling necessity has been shown for the wholesale discovery and pro-
duction of a grand jury transcript under Rule 34.
When the precise question of whether the Jencks Act or Jencks doc-
trine applied to grand jury testimony was reached by the United States
Supreme Court a year later in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United
States,5 8 the Court, in a 5-4 decision, rejected the proposed extension
of the doctrine and held that Rule 6(e) continued to cover the situa-
tion, as it had since its inception.5 9 The burden remained on the de-
fendant "to show that 'a particularized need' exists for the minutes
which outweighs the policy of secrecy." 60 Notwithstanding the fact
that some of the more damaging testimony of the primary witness of
the government was unsubstantiated by other witnesses, the Court
concluded that the defendants had not met this burden. In a vigorous
dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan accused his brethren in the majority of
"exalt [ing] the principle of secrecy for secrecy's sake. '61
This was the state of the conventional wisdom relating to disclosure
of grand jury minutes until 1966 when two significant events oc-
curred: first, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was
amended to permit the defendant to inspect and copy any
''relevant ... recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand
54. Id. at 681.
55. Id. at 682.
56. Id. at 683 n.7.
57. Id. at 683 (italics in original).
58. 360U.S. 395 (1959).
59. Id. at 398-99.
60. Id. at 400.
61. Id. at 407.
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jury,"62 and second, Dennis v. United States63 was decided. Rule
16(a)(3) was added to provide that upon motion of the defendant the
court may order the inspection of the defendant's testimony before
the grand jury. Since this provision falls within the general discovery
section of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it follows that if
the defendant's motion is granted, he is entitled to pretrial inspection
rather than having to wait until the trial commences as he must under
Rule 6. Unfortunately, the amendment did not go far enough and
grant the defendant access to his own testimony as a matter of right,
but subjected disclosure to the discretion of the trial court. 64 As a con-
sequence, judicial interpretation of the rule has varied from the re-
strictive, 65 which places the bruden on the defendant, to the liberal, 66
which shifts the burden to the government. The better view is to inter-
pret Rule 16(a)(3) as granting defendant an absolute right to his testi-
mony subject only to the government's right to a protective order in
rare cases pursuant to Rule 16(e).67
In Dennis the Supreme Court once again confronted the issue of
disclosure of grand jury testimony. At trial, the defendants moved for
the inspection of the grand jury testimony of four government wit-
nesses after each witness had testifed on direct examination. This
motion was denied by the trial court on the ground that no particular-
ized need had been shown. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that
62. The new text of the rule states: "Upon motion of a defendant the court may
order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or
photograph any relevant . . .(3) recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand
jury." FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(3). Such access "had ordinarily been denied prior to
1966." 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 253 at 502-03 (1969).
63. 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
64. Commenting on the loopholes remaining under the new rule, one author con-
cluded, "Specifically, a defendant proceeding under Rule 16(a)(3) may be caused
trouble by the words 'relevant,' 'recorded,' and 'may.'" Comment, Discovery by a
Criminal Defendant of his own Grand Jury Testimony, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 311, 314
(1968).
65. United States v. Roberts, 264 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
66. United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); C. WRIGHT, supra
note 62, at 503 n.38; Comment, supra note 64, at 316.
67. C. WRIGHT, supra note 62, at 179, reaches a similar conclusion: "Rule 16(a)
should be read as giving a defendant an absolute right to the materials there listed, save
only for the requirement that they be relevant, as the rule requires, and possible protec-
tive orders under Rule 16(e)." See note 31 supra for the text of Rule 16(e). See also the
proposed amendment to Rule 16(a)(3) by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States changing the word "may" to
"shall," thus making disclosure of the defendant's grand jury testimony mandatory. Pre-
liminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
for the United States District Courts, 48 F.R.D. 547, 587-88 (1970).
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recent developments making grand jury testimony available to defend-
ants were "entirely consonnant with the growing realization that dis-
closure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily
promotes the proper administration of criminal justice. ' 68 The Court
went on to cite Jencks, the Jencks Act and the amendments to Rule
16 as further evidence of this trend.69
Judicial reaction to Dennis split two ways, undoubtedly due to the
fact that the opinion was not altogether free from ambiguity. Some
courts gave it a limited interpretation,70 while others followed the lead
of United States v. Youngblood,71 which held, prospectively only, that
the defense was entitled to that part of the witness' grand jury testi-
mony which related to his testimony at trial without any showing of
particularized need.
IV. THE JENCKS ACT AMENDMENT AND BEYOND
Three years later, the Youngblood rationale was adopted by Con-
gress in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.72 Specifically, this
statute amended the Jencks Act to cover grand jury testimony of wit-
nesses who testify at trial, by adding to the definition of the word
"statement" in subsection (e) the following: "(3) a statement, however
taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any, made by said
witness to a grand jury.173 This amendment grants the defendant the
same rights in connection with the grand jury testimony of witnesses
as he had had with respect to statements and reports made by govern-
ment witnesses to agents of the United States since the enactment of
the statute.74
68. 384 U.S. at 870.
69. Id. at 870-7 1.
70. Stewart v. United States, 395 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Hens-
ley, 374 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1967); Walsh v. United States, 371 F.2d 436 (1st Cir. 1967).
In each of these cases, the appellate court involved interpreted Dennis as still requiring
the defendant to carry the burden of showing a "particularized need" for the production
of the grand jury records, and each court held that the defendants before it had not
shown such need.
71. 379F.2d365(2dCir. 1967).
72. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title I, § 102, 84
Stat. 922. For the legislative history, see 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4007, 4017.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(3) (1970). See note 49 supra for text.
74. This amendment overrides the effect of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United
States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959). See notes 58-61 and accompanying text supra.
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The obvious weaknesses in the amendment lie in (1) the discretion
to record the testimony of grand jury witnesses, which discretion gen-
erally seems to reside with the United States Attorney,75 (2) the use of
hearsay evidence to evade the thrust of the new right,76 and (3) the
possibility of withholding key witnesses from the grand jury entirely. 77
Of the three possibilities for abuse, by far the worst is the lack of re-
cordation; the other two possibilities would be obvious and subject to
court control. As it stands now, the practice of reporting grand jury
testimony varies a great deal from district to district78 and can be ex-
pensive. We are confronted with the cold truth that there is no specific
federal constitutional or statutory mandate, or uniform rule79 re-
quiring recordation of grand jury testimony; and at least in the Ninth
Circuit8 0 no local court rule exists except in the Northern District of
California,81 where as a practical matter it is complied with only when
the United States Attorney so wishes.82 This custom of allowing the
government to decide the issue of recordation seems to be fairly repre-
sentative in the Ninth Circuit.83 In the absence of a written rule, it is
75. See note 83 infra.
76. This possibility was avoided in United States v. Arcuri, 282 F. Supp. 347
(E.D.N.Y. 1968) where the court stated that the indictment would be dismissed if hearsay
evidence was presented to the grand jury when direct evidence was available.
77. This practice could be prohibited by court decision similar to that referred to in
note 76 supra. See the dissent in United States v. Beltram, 388 F.2d 449, 451 (2d Cir.
1968).
78. See notes 84-86 and accompanying text infra.
79. Campbell v. United States, 368 F.2d 521, 522 (10th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Cianchetti, 315 F.2d 584, 591 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Ciampa, 290 F.2d 83, 85
(2d Cir. 1961) (government must have a transcript of its witness' testimony before the
grand jury available when the witness is called at the trial, but this duty applies only if
the grand jury testimony has been recorded). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 753(b)(3) (1970) (court
reporters shall attend "such other proceedings as a judge of the court shall direct or as
may be required by rule or order of court or as may be requested by any party to the
proceedings"). FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 is silent on reporting, while Rule 6(d) is permissive.
80. The authors of this report contacted each district court in the Ninth Circuit
between June and September, 197 1, in order to ascertain how many of such districts, if
any, had a written rule or rules relating to grand juries with special emphasis on re-
porting the testimony of witnesses. We received a reply from every district. Specific let-
ters will be referred to in notes 82 to 91 infra. This data is now over a year old and it is
entirely possible that some districts have amended their rules since then to include some
provision for recordation.
81. Rule 18 of Local Rules of Practice, United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, reads as follows: "In all proceedings before the federal
grand jury a reporter shall be present and shall report the proceedings in the same
fashion as trial proceedings in open court are reported. Transcriptions will be prepared
and distributed pursuant to order of the court upon good cause shown."
82. Letter from United States District Judge Alfonso J. Zirpoli, June 14, 1971.
83. Letters from United States District Judges Alfonso J. Zirpoli, June 14, 1971;
Roger D. Foley, July 19, 1971; Edward J. Schwartz, July 21, 1971; Gus J. Solomon,
July 23, 1971 and Martin Pence, July 29, 1971.
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not surprising that recording in this circuit runs the spectrum from
"6never" in the District of Alaska 4 to "always" in the Eastern District
of Washington.85 In between these extremes, the practice is widely
divergent.86 Even when testimony is recorded, the practice of provid-
ing the defendant with a transcript varies from. "always" in Idaho
and Nevada87 to "never" in the Eastern and Southern Districts of Cal-
ifornia and Hawaii unless there is a showing of "particularized need."8 8
In Montana and the Central District of California disclosure depends
"on the facts in a particular case."89 In some instances, only the testi-
mony of particular witnesses is recorded;90 in others, only that of first
hand witnesses is recorded, presumably "to guard against retraction."91
Since the Jencks Act now permits the defendants to obtain the
grand jury testimony of witnesses at trial if such testimony has been
recorded, 92 it seems somewhat anomalous under our adversary system
to place the decision of recordation in the hands of the United States
Attorney,93 one of the combatants. 94 In August, 1965, the American
Bar Association Special Committee on Federal Rules of Procedure
recommended that Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
be amended to require disclosure of grand jury minutes after indict-
ment and that "a reporter transcribe the minutes of all proceedings of
grand jury which are accusatorial in nature [and] that the cost of
such transcript be borne by the government of the United States ...."95
84. Letter from United States District Judge Raymond E. Plummer, Aug. 6, 1971.
85. Letter from United States District Judge Charles L. Powell, Aug. 6, 1971.
86. The Central and Eastern Districts of California and the District of Montana
generally do not record, as per letters from United States District Judges Albert Lee
Stephens, Jr., Aug. 12, 1971, Thomas J. MacBride, Sept. 9, 1971, and Russell E. Smith,
July 14, 197 1, respectively. The Western District of Washington generally does record.
Letter from United States District Judge George H. Boldt, July 23, 1971.
87. Letters from United States District Judges Ray McNichols, July 20, 1971, and
Roger D. Foley, July 19, 1971, respectively.
88. Letters from United States District Judges Thomas J. MacBride, Sept. 9, 1971,
Edward J. Schwartz, July 21, 197 1, and Martin Pence, July 29, 1971, respectively.
89. Letters from United States District Judges Russell E. Smith, July 14, 1971, and
Albert Lee Stephens, Jr., Aug. 12, 197 1, respectively.
90. Letter from United States District Judge James A. Walsh, July 15, 1971.
91. Letter from United States District Judge Ray McNichols, July 20, 1971.
92. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
94. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,182 (1970)!the Court made this pertinent
comment: "The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker
game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until
played."




Such an amendment would not only benefit the defendant, but, it is
submitted, would also have a salutary effect in controlling over-
reaching or improper examination of witnesses by the prosecution.9 6
United States District Judge Raymond J. Pettine puts it this way: 97
In no way does recordation inhibit the grand jury's investigation.
True, recordation restrains certain prosecutorial practices which might
in its absence be used, but that is no reason not to record. Indeed, a
sophisticated prosecutor must acknowledge that there develops be-
tween a grand jury and the prosecutor with whom the jury is closeted a
rapport-a dependency relationship-which can easily be turned into
an instrument of influence on grand jury deliberations. Recordation is
the most effective restraint upon such potential abuses.
If the recording of grand jury testimony is to be seriously consid-
ered however, perhaps some concern should also be given to the cost
of such a sweeping change in basic procedures. In fiscal year 1971, a
total of 41,290 original criminal proceedings were commenced in all
the districts of the United States, of which 28,666 or 69.4 percent
were originated by indictment. 98 A more accurate percentage of cases
commenced by indictment would appear to be 84 -percent, however,
since only 34,111 of the 41,290 cases were felonies. The total cost to
the government for providing 409 court reporters to the federal judi-
ciary in fiscal 1972 was estimated at $8,000,000, not including office
space in federal buildings. 99 Although the authors were unable to ob-
tain sufficient data to estimate with any degree of accuracy what the
costs of reporting and transcribing every federal grand jury pro-
ceeding would be,100 we nevertheless suggest that it is unlikely, in view
of the fact that in fiscal 1970 there were 16,032 cases tried, of which
96. 8J. MOORE. FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 6.02(2) at 6-11(1970).
97. United States v. Gramolini, 301 F. Supp. 39, 41-42 (D.R.I. 1969).
98. Letter from Edward V. Garabedian, Assistant Chief for Finance, Division of
Business Administration, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Oct. 1,
1971.
99. Id.
100. There do not appear to be any central statistics showing the number of grand
jury proceedings reported, whether in whole or in part, the number of days spent on such
proceedings and the time required to transcribe those portions of testimony currently
demanded by United States Attorneys. Obviously, this data would be needed in order to
determine what proportion of the average court reporter's time is spent on such en-
deavors. Moreover, the practice prior to the Jencks Act amendment, which became
effective several months after fiscal 1971 began, may not be indicative of what we can
expect in the future.
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9,440 were civil,101 that the total expense of such an enterprise would
amount to more than 50 to 60 percent of the current budget for court
reporters (not including office space).
Of course, it is entirely possible that electronic reporting may in
time become so improved 02 that such costs could be reduced signifi-
cantly. However, whether we continue to use stenographic recordation
or not, "the cost is clearly justified by the improved administration of
criminal justice.' 03
We have come a long way since Learned Hand made his classical
statement on grand jury discovery in 1923.104 Prior to the trial, the
defendant can obtain copies of any written or recorded statements or
confessions made by him which are in the government's possession, as
well as his own recorded testimony made before a grand jury.105 Sub-
ject to the qualification that the pretrial testimony has been recorded,
the defendant may also obtain the grand jury testimony of govern-
ment witnesses who testify during the trial.10 6 What more could a de-
fendant ask for now that he has reached this best of all possible situa-
tions in this best of all possible worlds? Well, for one thing, he could
ask that all grand jury testimony be recorded, 07 and for another, that
he be given a transcript thereof prior to the trial. That, at least, would
place him more on a par with the prosecution. Furthermore, it is gen-
erally conceded that discovery is most effective when it occurs at the
101. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1970 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, Table C8 at 255.
102. But see Boyko, The Case Against Electronic Courtroom Reporting, 57
A.B.AJ. 1008 (1971).
103. United States v. Gramolini, 301 F. Supp. 39, 42 (D.R.I. 1969).
104. See note 35 supra.
105. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a). See note 31 supra for text of Rule 16(a).
106. 18 U.SC. § 3500(e)(3) (1970).
107. See United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654, 665-66 (9th Cir. 1970), where the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals approved the denial by the trial court of the defendants'
motion for an order compelling the presence of a court reporter at an upcoming grand
jury proceeding. The appellate court stated that the rule in the Ninth Circuit is that rec-
ording or transcribing of grand jury testimony is permissive, not mandatory, and that
only where there is a clear indication of prejudice will a refusal to honor an advance
request that a court reporter be present result in a dismissal. Judge Ely, in a concurring
opinion, took exception to the majority opinion for failing to disapprove the refusal on
the part of the prosecution to allow reporting of the grand jury proceedings, expressing
the personal belief that transcripts of grand jury proceedings should be made available to
those indicted and that in the future such would become a matter of right with appro-
priate safeguards. Id. at 668.
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pretrial stage where it can be used to prepare for the trial itself.108
This philosophy, of course, underlies the provisions of Rule 16. Why
should discovery of statements and grand jury testimony be dealt with
differently from discovery of tangibles? The traditional reasons ad-
vanced for this distinction, found in United States v. Proctor & Gamble
Co.,10 9 are as follows:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contem-
plated;
(2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations,
and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from
importuning the grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses
who may testify before grand jury and later appear at the trial of
those indicted by it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who
have information with respect to the commission of crimes;
(5) to protect innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of
the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the ex-
pense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
As Wright, 110 Calkins,"' and Louisell"12 have pointed out, how-
ever, once the investigation is completed, the indictment returned and
the defendant arrested, some of these grounds for secrecy become
inapplicable. Clearly this is true of the first, second and fifth reasons.
With respect to the argument that secrecy prevents suborning perjury
or tampering with prospective witnesses at the trial, the following
points have been made in opposition: since the names of witnesses are
provided to the defendant prior to the trial in most jurisdictions, any-
one wishing to suborn or tamper with those witnesses can do so
without having access to what they said before the grand jury;1 13 sec-
ondly, as stated by Mr. Justice Brennan, "how can we be so positive
108. Louisell, supra note 28, at 78; Traynor, supra note 32; Semerjan, The Right of
Confrontation, 55 A.B.AJ. 152, 156 (1969).
109. 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958). This summary was first set out in United States
v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931). It is quoted
with approval in United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954). See also C.
WRIGHT, supra note 62, at 170 n.86.
110. C. WRIGHT, supra note 62, at 170-71.
111. Calkins, supra note 7, at 458-62.
112. Louisell, supra note 28, at 70-7 1.
113. Calkins, supra note 7, at 462.
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criminal discovery will produce perjured defenses when we have in
this country virtually shut the door to all such discovery?" '114
Of course, the rule with respect to witnesses' names does not exist
in the federal courts except in cases of treason or capital offenses, 115
and as a practical matter it would appear that most courts do not re-
quire the United States Attorney to make such information available
to the defendant. 116 It is worthy of note, however, that the ABA Pro-
ject on Standards for Criminal Justice has proposed that "the names
and addresses of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to
call as witnesses at the hearing or trial"117 be discoverable as a matter
of right. As for Mr. Justice Brennan's question above, it is difficult to
answer. To quote Dean Wigmore, "the possibility that a dishonest
accused will misuse such an opportunity is no reason for committing
the injustice of refusing the honest accused a fair means of clearing
himself."118 We might even go one step further and argue that the run
of the mill defendant, whether guilty or not, should have the right to
put on the very best defense possible, including the impeachment of
government witnesses. Moreover, the trial courts have power to issue
protective orders tailored to meet the particular situation where the
prosecution contends that the safety of prospective witnesses may be
jeopardized, or where intimidation, tampering or other improper con-
duct appears to be a distinct possibility. 1 9 In addition, if the de-
fendant or his counsel should attempt to tamper with government wit-
nesses, the government could make greater use of the criminal sanc-
tion against obstructing justice. 120
Concerning the fourth reason-the encouragement of free and un-
114. Brennan, Remarks on Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 56, 62 (1963).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1970). The law as it now stands appears to be anomalous to
say the least, for in cases of treason or a capital offense the defendant is permitted access
to the names of government witnesses three days prior to trial, but in less serious crimes
where the defendant would seem to have less reason to attempt to influence such wit-
nesses he has no right to the names at all.
116. United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Glass,
421 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Eagleston, 417 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1969);
Edmondson v. United States, 402 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1968).
117. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCE-
DURE BEFORE TRIAL § 2(l)(a)(i) (Tent. Draft 1969). See also Preliminary Draft, supra
note 67, at 589-90.
118. Brennan, supra note 114, at 63.
119. Dennis, 384 U.S. at 875. Although Rule 6 does not so provide, it appears that
the Supreme Court has concluded that Rule 16(e) covers the situation.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1970).
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trammeled disclosures of crimes by persons with such information-
the witness must realize when he is first contacted by the prosecution
that any testimony he gives to the grand jury will in most cases also
have to be given at the trial. Any prosecuting attorney who did not so
advise a key government witness, who due to ignorance or naivet6
failed to recognize this fact, would seem to be remiss in his duty.
A few states, by statute,1 21 provide that a defendant is entitled to a
copy of the grand jury minutes. One of these, California, has been
doing this ever since 1897.122 In view of this long experience and the
fact that this paper was being prepared for the Ninth Circuit Judicial
Conference, the authors prepared a questionnaire 123 in June, 1971,
which was sent to every district attorney in that state. Of 60 such
questionnaires, we received 40 replies, to wit: 18 from counties under
100,000 in population, 12 from those counties between 100,000 and
500,000, five from those counties between 500,000 and 1,000,000,
four from those counties between one and two million and one from a
county over two million. The first three questions asked for both
objective and subjective answers concerning tampering with witnesses
(Question 1), fabrication of an alibi (Question 2), and the reluctance
of witnesses to testify before the grand jury (Question 3) "during the
last five years." Almost three to one (29-11) the respondents stated
that they had no actual knowledge of tampering, while 23-14 believed
no tampering had occurred. Of those who stated that they were aware
of tampering, such misconduct had occurred in only 1.75 percent of
their indictments. 23 had no knowledge of an alibi having been fabri-
cated, while 15 had such knowledge. However, only 16 were of the
opinion that no defendant had done so while 20 believed otherwise.
Of the large minority of district attorneys who in fact had en-
countered fabricated alibis, the percentages of cases in which each be
lieved fabricated alibis were present ranged from one through 40 with
an average of three percent. The figures relating to Question No. 3,
dealing with whether witnesses had been reluctant to testify because
121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 938.1 (West 1970); IowA CODE § 772.4 (1962); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 516 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.04 (1947). See also Calkins, supra note 7, at
466 n.42. Apparently, at the time of Calkins' article four other states also permitted
pretrial disclosure of grand jury minutes in order to prepare for trial. Id. at 465 n.38.
122. CAL. PENAL CODE § 938.1 (West 1970). In 1927 this practice became compul-
sory. Calkins, supra note 7, at 466 n.42.
123. See Appendix to this article infra.
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of disclosure provisions, were almost evenly divided: 21 yeas to 19
nays based on experience, and 16 versus 17 based on opinion. 24
Again, those district attorneys who had encountered reluctant wit-
nesses estimated that this had occurred in only five percent of their
cases. 28 opined that California's disclosure provisions were "benefi-
cial," with ten concluding they were "detrimental" to the criminal jus-
tice system. 34 out of 39 felt that "aside from tampering with wit-
nesses, fabricating of defenses and causing witnesses to become reluc-
tant to testify before the grand jury," there were no other reasons for
refusing to provide a defendant with a copy of the grand jury tran-
script. 125 Of the five who felt there were other reasons, two listed
"publicity," one "retaliation," one merely opposed giving the de-
fendant the testimony of witnesses who would not be used at the trial
and whose testimony would be of no help to the defendant and the
fifth was of the opinion that it could affect efficient prosecution in
those situations where one defendant was in custody while the other
was still at large. The average number of felony prosecutions initiated
by indictment was 7.38 percent in counties under 100,000 and 7.45
percent, 3.2 percent, 7.75 percent and under one percent, respec-
tively, for the other categories. These figures are significantly lower
than the federal figure of 84 percent in fiscal 1971.126
One conclusion drawn from this survey is that the three major rea-
sons generally offered in support of the policy of nondisclosure of
grand jury testimony are based largely on unfounded fears. Neither
tampering with witnesses, fabrication of alibis nor reluctance of wit-
nesses to testify before the grand jury seems to be a problem of any
significance in California. Moreover, the overwhelming majority felt
there were no other reasons for denying a defendant a copy of the en-
tire transcript. And, even with respect to the minority who believed
publicity, retaliation and at-large co-defendants were a problem, these
matters could be handled by protective orders. For example, counsel
for both sides and the defendant could be directed by the court not to
divulge to the press or others the contents of the grand jury transcript;
the testimony of key witnesses could be preserved by deposition, thus
124. A number of those reporting experiences of witness reluctance failed to ex-
press an opinion.
125. A somewhat humorous note was provided by one reply: "Aren't those reasons
enough?"
126. See text immediately following note 98 supra.
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diminishing the possibility of retaliation prior to trial; 127 and the
in-custody co-defendant's receipt of the transcript could be delayed to
a point just prior to trial. Finally, the fact that 74 percent of the dis-
trict attorneys, who have been part of a system in which complete
pretrial disclosure is made to the defendant, are of the opinion that
such disclosure is beneficial to the administration of criminal justice
must be worthy of that additional consideration generally accorded to
judgments based on experience.
Beyond the issue of scope of discovery is the question of when dis-
covery should be allowed. Should the defendant have full pretrial dis-
covery rights, or should he only be allowed a copy of a trial witness'
grand jury testimony sometime after the trial has actually begun?
As far back as 1957 the California Supreme Court extended the
right of the defendant in a criminal case to pretrial discovery.1 28 Con-
cededly, this case dealt only with the defendant's own signed state-
ment and a transcript of a recording to the police, but Funk v. Supe-
rior Court12 9 broadened this right to include statements made to the
prosecution by others. Thus, we see that in 1959 California had
passed somewhat beyond the limited and restrictive confines of the
federal practice under the Jencks Act. Nevertheless it remained for the
court in Cash v. Superior Court'30 to articulate the rationale of
pretrial discovery in criminal cases when it stated: "the basis for re-
quiring pretrial production of material in the hands of the prosecution
is the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to a fair
trial." 31 In 1964, Dean A. Kenneth Pye argued for pretrial discovery
in these terms:132
Every other civilized nation permits broad discovery. Our military law
does so as well. Apparently the existence of discovery has not occa-
sioned a total breakdown of any of these systems. I am sure that those
of you in criminal practice are aware of the practice in our Court of
General Sessions where as a result of the counter hearing there is
complete discovery in almost every case. I have not heard it suggested
127. Retaliation after trial, of course, is not affected by pretrial disclosure.
128. Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957).
129. Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959).
130. Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 75, 346 P.2d 407, 408 (1959).
131. id. at 75, 346 P.2d at 408.
132. Pye, The Defendant's Case for More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 82, 91-92
(1960).
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that the rate of perjury is higher in the Court of General Sessions than
it is in the District Court.
And Mr. Justice Jackson has stated that at the Nuremberg war trials
objection was made by the Soviet attorneys to the limited discovery
permitted by the United States as being unfair to defendants. 133
In this day when most defendants are indigent and many defense
counsel are appointed by or affiliated with defender offices,' 3 4 Dean
Pye suggests that fears of bribery and intimidation are somewhat un-
real. Furthermore, he acknowledges his confidence in "most retained
counsel"'1 5 and adds that if dishonest and unscrupulous attorneys are
found, they should be dealt with by bench and bar. Dean Pye con-
cludes that: "We should not, however, eliminate discovery to all de-
fendants upon the .supposition that some counsel cannot be
trusted.' 36 As for organized crime, the dangers of perjury, intimida-
tion and bribery exist without discovery. 37 And, as suggested above,
the court can refuse discovery in such cases or protect the prosecu-
tion's case by taking the key witness' deposition. If such a witness
should be eliminated prior to trial, the testimony could still be used to
convict, and, possibly of greater importance from the practical point
of view, organized crime might hesitate to take punitive measures
against such a witness if the reason for the witness' failure to testify in
person might, directly or indirectly, come to the jury's attention. The
use of protective orders, criminal sanctions and pretrial depositions of
key witnesses would seem to be the answer to most, if not all, of the
arguments against pretrial discovery.
133. Bull, Nurnberg Trial, 7 F.R.D. 175, 178 (1947), quotes Mr. Justice Jackson as
follows:
The Soviet Delegation objected to our practice on the ground that it is not fair to
defendants. Under the Soviet System when an indictment is filed every document
and the statement of every witness which is expected to be used against the de-
fendant must be filed with the court and made known to the defense. It was ob-
jected that under our system the accused does not know the statements of accusing
witnesses nor the documents that may be used against him, that such evidence is
first made known to him at trial too late to prepare a defense, and that this tends to
make the trial something of a game instead of a real inquest into guilt. It must be
admitted that there is a great deal of truth in this criticism. We reached a compro-
mise by which the Nurnberg indictment was more informative than in English or
American practice but less so than in Soviet and French practice.







It is submitted that the present status of disclosure of grand jury
proceedings under the cases, Rule 16(a), and the Jencks Act is inade-
quate in two respects: (1) except for the defendant's own testimony, he
must wait until after the government witness has testified for a copy of
such witness' grand jury testimony, and (2) he is entitled to that only if
such testimony has been recorded. The Jencks Act amendment with
respect to grand jury testimony suffers from the same defects as the
rest of the statute in that it is time consuming and cumbersome. But of
even greater significance is the fact that it precludes adequate pretrial
preparation by defense counsel, thereby giving a decided advantage to
the prosecution. All other items of discovery under Rule 16 are sub-
ject to pretrial disclosure, but the testimony and statements of prose-
cution witnesses still languish tinder the Jencks Act rule. The reasons
set out in Proctor & Gamble138 for nondisclosure have been demol-
ished time and again,' 3 9 but the strange inertia of the law has pre-
vented their complete demise. We believe that pretrial disclosure of
grand jury testimony is called for now, that all federal grand jury pro-
ceedings should be recorded, and that the courts stand ready to deter
any improper conduct on the part of defendants or defense counsel by
the use of protective orders, depositions and the criminal sanction if
appropriate. Specifically, we recommend that Rule 6 be amended as
follows: 140
(1):
(e) SECRECY OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCLOSURE. Disclosure
138. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 110-20 supra.
140. New matter is underlined; matter to be omitted is bracketed.
In making this recommendation we are fully aware of the statement in Palermo v.
United States, 360 U.S. 343, 350 (1959) to the effect that the Jencks Act provides the
exclusive means for discovery of statements coming within its purview. Traynor, supra
note 32, at 241; Borillo, Section 3500: Justice on a Tightrope, 45 MARQ. L. REV. 205,
218-20 (1961); 47 MINN. L. REV. 693, 698-99 (1963); 58 MICH. L. REV. 888, 890-93
(1960); but see, United States v. Murray, 927 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 828 (1962); United States v. Taylor, 25 F.R.D. 225, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). Never-
theless, we believe that the Supreme Court has the power to modify the Jencks Act
through its rule making power under 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970), since no amendment to
the rules becomes effective until the expiration of 90 days after it has been reported to
Congress. If Congress takes no action on the amendment by that time the amendment
supersedes all laws in conflict therewith.
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of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations
and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the gov-
ernment for use in the performance of their duties. After the return
of an indictment and after the defendant has been apprehended, a
transcript of all the testimony before the grand jury shall be provided
to the defendant or defense counsel, without cost, not less than thirty
days prior to the commencement of the trial of said defendant. Other-
wise a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of a record-
ing device or any typist who transcribes recorded testimony may
disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed
by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial pro-
ceeding [, or when permitted by the court at the request of the
defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dis-
miss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand
jury. ]. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any person
except in accordance with this rule. The court may direct that an in-
dictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has
given bail, and in that event the clerk shall seal the indictment and no
person shall disclose the finding of the indictment except when neces-
sary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons.
(2): A new subsection (f) be added, with the present subsections (f)
and (g) being designated as (g) and (h), respectively:
(f) PROTECTIVE ORDERS, Upon a sufficient showing the
court may at any time order that the discovery or inspection be de-
nied, restricted or deferred, or may make such other order as is appro-
priate. Upon motion by the government the court may permit the gov-
ernment to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a
written statement to be inspected by the court in camera. If the court
enters an order granting relief following a showing in camera, the en-
tire text of the government's statement shall be sealed and preserved in
the records of the court to be made available to the appellate court in
the event of an appeal by the defendant.
(3): A new subsection (i) be added:
(i) All testimony presented before the grand jury in the investiga-
tion of criminal causes shall be recorded, and in all cases where an
indictment is returned such testimony shall be transcribed at govern-
ment expense within thirty days of the indictment unless otherwise
ordered by the court for good cause shown. 141
141. Although the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference tabled the matter of approving
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We suggest that these proposals are based on sound jurisprudential
policies, and that by making grand jury testimony subject to pretrial
disclosure, thus placing it on a par with discovery under Rule 16
while at the same time emphasizing the government's right to protec-
tive orders when necessary, we have added the letter of the law to the
spirit exemplified in Dennis, to wit: "disclosure, rather than suppres-
sion, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the proper administra-
tion of criminal justice."' 42
or disapproving of this report at its annual convention in Pasadena, California in July
1972, it did express itself informally on the proposed amendments to Rule 6 as follows:
YES NO ABSTAIN
37 40 0 Proposed Amendment to Rule 6(e).
42 20 15 Proposed Amendment in the form of a new sub-section,
Rule 6(f).
63 13 1 Proposed Amendment in the form of a new sub-section,
Rule 6(i).
It should be noted that only 77 ballots were cast on these questions. In earlier balloting
on the exclusionary rule, 198 ballots were cast. Thus less than 40 percent of the Confer-
ence membership voted on the above proposals.
142. 384 U.S. at 870.
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APPENDIX
CALIFORNIA GRAND JURY QUESTIONNAIRE*
1. During the last five years has any grand jury witness ever been tampered
with (intimidated, bribed or been suborned to commit perjury) as a result
of the grand jury disclosure provisions of the California Penal Code?
(a) To your knowledge or in the experience of your office:
NO YES Under l%, 3%,5%,10%,15%,20%,30%,40%,50%, over 50%.
(b) In your opinion:
NO YES Under 1%, 3%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, over 50%.
Comments:
2. During the last five years, has any defendant fabricated an alibi or other
defense as a result of said disclosure provisions?
(a) To your knowledge or in the experience of your office:
NO YES Under 1%,3%,5%,10%,l5%,20%,30%,40%,50%,over50%.
(b) In your opinion:
NO YES Under 1%, 3%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 30%, 40%, over 50%.
Comments: .
3. During the last five years, has any witness been reluctant to testify before
the grand jury because of said disclosure provisions?
(a) To your knowledge or in the experience of your office:
NO YES Under 1%, 3%,5%,10%,15%,20%,30%,40%, 50%, over50%.
(b) In your opinion:
NO YES Under 1%, 3%,5%,10%,l5%,20%,30%,40%,50%,over50%.
Comments:
4. In your opinion are said disclosure provisions beneficial or detrimental
to the criminal justice system?
BENEFICIAL DETRIMENTAL
Comments:
5. In your opinion, aside from tampering with witnesses, fabricating of
defenses, and causing witnesses to become reluctant to testify before the
* Where appropriate, please circle all answers, including percentages. Although
all replies will be kept strictly confidential by the director of this survey, we will
understand if you would rather not answer Question 7.
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grand jury, are there any other reasons for not providing a defendant
with a copy of the transcript of grand jury proceedings?
NO YES
If your answer is "YES" please set forth specific reasons therefor.
6. What percentage of felony cases in your office are initiated by grand
jury indictment?
7. Name of County
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